LOCAL DEVELOPMENT, BIG FIRMS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL by Bellandi, Marco
1
EUROPEAN CONGRESS OF THE REGIONAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION,
AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 1, 2000, BARCELONA
Local Development, Big Firms and Social Capital (nr.380)
Marco Bellandi
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, Università degli Studi di Firenze.
Address: Facoltà di Economia, Via Curtatone 1, 50123 Firenze, Italy,
Tel. +39-0552710-413, Fax. +39-0552710-424
marco.bellandi@cce.unifi.it, http://www.cce.unifi.it/dse/mbelland.htm
Abstract: Working on various streams of literature concerning multinational and re-
gional development, a classification of potential linkages between big firms and local
economies will be proposed. Then, building on a model of a strong local economy, that
is the industrial district, a framework will be sketched in which different combinations
of linkages are put in relation with different pools and degrees of strength of social
capital and other local factors. The main thesis is that reciprocal positive linkages are
more probable where and when the local (social) capital is neither too weak nor too
strong. Some final remarks will concern the debate on policies fostering the develop-
mental role of multinational in local economies.
1. Introduction: Two engines of industrial development
According to a recent statement by G. Becattini (1998), the Italian economic
growth in the last decades has been pulled by ‘two types of industrial engine’, each one
with its own logic. They are the big firms and the industrial districts characterised by
clusters of small-specialised firms
1. Since recently, the relations between the two en-
gines have not been the object of deep investigation. According to the mainstream, there
is just one engine of growth, that is big efficient firms; and small firms’ vitality is either
the manifestation of interstitial life, or the result of strategies of production subcon-
tracting controlled by big firms.
A starting point of the literature on Italian industrial districts, since the end of the
Seventies, was precisely the rejection of the standard interpretation. This well explains
the focus on cases and models in which district small firms are clearly separated from
the activities of big firms, while embedded in a local context allowing a rich reproduc-
tion of social capital, entrepreneurial attitudes, focussed industrial competencies.
An important exception to such focus is the investigation on the phases of birth
of industrial districts. Here, a positive if transitory role of units of big firms, either in-2
ternal or external, has been traditionally acknowledged (Brusco, 1986). More recently,
many investigations have been showing an increasing intersection between locations of
units of big firms and well-developed Italian industrial districts. The two types of phe-
nomena represent a natural field of empirical evidence and tests for the framework
which we will try to develop in this paper, concerning linkages between big firms and
local economies.
Making reference to models and cases of strong local economies not dominated
by big firms, the paper tries to enlarge on the results of the literature and thinking de-
voted to the possibility of a developmental role of the investments of big (external)
firms in local economies. Generally, in such literature, the local economy is either a
strong one in which headquarters and strategic divisions of innovative big firms are
rooted, or  a weak one with some set of local small traditional firms and the possible lo-
cation of branch plants or subcontracting relations by big firms.
2. A typology of linkages
In what follows the expression ‘big firm’ is used in order to indicate an eco-
nomic entity (single legal entities, or networks with a strategic centre) characterised by
an internal managerial organisation and by local units (branch plants, offices, controlled
companies) in two (or more) not contiguous local systems. ‘Local firms’ have units only
within one cluster of contiguous local systems. Just to make easier the reading, we will
refer indifferently to one local system and to the regional cluster including it.
2 ‘Trading
entrepreneurs’ are those who run companies with inter or translocal units of activity, but
without an internal managerial structure.
Big firms enlarge the connections between the different local systems in which
they are located. They are an important means by which productive knowledge is trans-
ferred and complex translocal productive processes are realised. Trading entrepreneurs
may accomplish the same function, usually with different results (Casson 1997).
Let us try to define the set of possible economic linkages between one big firm
and the local firms of one local system (Young et al. 1994, Florio 1996, Zanfei 2000). A
first distinction regards the geographical overlapping: does the big firm have locations
within the local system, or not? A second distinction concerns the economic nature of
the linkage: complementary or substitutive. Other related discriminations concern the
mechanisms of relation (markets, vertical control, trust), the objects of the linkage3
(products, services, knowledge), the location of big firm’s units (headquarters, plants,
R&D laboratories).
The combination of these distinctions generate a large chart of possible eco-
nomic linkages (not drawn here), from which a set of seemingly more important combi-
nations (between one big firm and one local system) are extracted.
The big firm has no unit located within the local system, it does not exchange
goods with the local firms, it does not compete against the products of the local firms,
but it is a competitor on some resource markets: for example, markets for financial as-
sets. An extension is the competition for public policies (fiscal, business, labour, inter-
national trade laws and regulations, etc.). A similar combination, but with an opposite
economic sign, is defined by complementary linkages on some resource markets. As
when the large demand of machinery and standardised intermediate products by the big
firm stimulates the development of specialised suppliers who, by means of innovation,
possibly extend their offers to the local firms.
The big firm has no unit within the local system, it does not exchange goods
with the local firms, but it does compete directly against their products, that is on the
same markets; or indirectly in the use of the budget of the same set of families. An op-
posite economic sign results when products are complementary in consumption, or
when the development of the big firm (of a very big firm, or of a set of big firms) has
positive income effects on the markets for the products of the local system.
The big firm has no unit within the local system but it exchanges goods with the
local firms. Here the first distinction is between the cases in which the big firm plays as
customer, and those where it plays as supplier. It is then important to distinguish the
cases in which the local firms are dependent suppliers, or customers dependent on the
monopolistic supplies of the big firm, from the various cases in which the economic re-
lation is less asymmetrical.
When the big firm has units (plants, offices, etc.) within the local system, the
economic relations defined by the three sets of combinations above tend to strengthen
(as for example with competition on local labour markets). The same distinctions apply
here again. But, the closer knitting implies that a couple of aspects gain a particular im-
portance: the linkages with local institutions, and the exchanges of productive knowl-
edge. The consideration of these two aspects generates two other important classes of
combinations. The first one defines - let me call it - the located but non-embedded big
firm. It is a case of low involvement of the big firm within the local system where it has4
some productive or administrative units, but where it is not actively interfering with lo-
cal institutions nor is actively exchanging knowledge on productive, organisational, and
market matters. Of course this class includes different cases: the economic role of the
big firm within the local system may vary, from the dominant to the marginal.
The last class of combinations defines precisely the embedded big firm, which
has some productive or administrative units in the local system, where it is actively
contributing to local institutions and actively exchanging knowledge on productive, or-
ganisational and market matters (Grabher 1993, Dicken et al. 1994). Here too, there are
important differences. The definition of the role and degree of embeddedness goes to-
gether with various aspects. The big firm may have origin within the same local system,
or have an external origin. The local system may be weak or strong. In the second case,
the location of the big firm may be one of the sources from which local productive ac-
tivities and firms have grown up, or the location may be the effect of the attractive
power of the strong pre-existing set of local activities and firms.
In what follows we focus on the embedded big firm, while other combinations
will be picked up when necessary for accommodating important variations on theme.
The main task is to define some general propositions on conditions and effects of local
embeddedness of big firms.  We maintain that non-generic propositions are more easily
defined if we take, as a vantage point, the case in which the big firm locates in a strong
local system where an autonomous logic of development based on local firms is not
casually rooted. This point takes us back to the second engine of industrial develop-
ment, the industrial district.
3. Social capital and local factor in the industrial district
External economies of scale and scope are at the core of the model of the indus-
trial district
3. They are partly external to single specialised firms, but largely internal to
the district, and in particular to clusters of specialised firms embedded in it. The tech-
nological source of such economies is represented by sets of complementary human and
technical specialised capital, whose productive use can be partitioned among different
specialised plants and firms
4.
The exchange among specialised producers can be hindered by all sorts of trans-
action costs. A specific and fundamental source of transaction costs in the case of exter-
nal economies of scale and scope is represented by the necessity of a joint supply of5
specific public goods. For example, the specialisation of productive units increases the
necessity of technical and communication standards. The convergence towards a com-
mon and correct design is a complex public good. The regulation by pure market trans-
actions (among the agents of the cluster) of a public good is subject to failures resulting
from the difficulties of bargaining the individual price for participating to large coali-
tions. Other difficulties may be associated to this fundamental one, in various ways:
problems of definition of property rights, imperfection of information, and asset speci-
ficity. In this sense external economies of scale and scope are externalities.
The supply of such standards by national public agencies is usually an inefficient
solution, too: the cluster presents very focused needs, whose understanding demands a
contextual knowledge. A possibly more efficient solution lies in the definition of stan-
dards as the result of collective action by cluster agents (for example Business Associa-
tions, Quality Consortia, etc.), and in their local diffusion as market rules.
Other types of specific public goods, and some specific club goods
5 as well,
have a similar connection with the organisation of the local division of labour, and  pre-
sent similar problems and solutions (Oughton and Whittam 1997). In case of success,
potential economies of scale and scope are realised as economies partially external to
the single firm, but internal to the cluster with its endowment of public (and quasi pub-
lic) goods.
The experience of contemporary industrial districts seems to suggest that the
supply of such goods is not only and simply the explicit result of purposeful decision-
making by collective agents. The collective result can be supported by the fundamental
structure of the socio-economic relations characterising the area. In this case the unit of
analysis is not properly the cluster of specialised firms, but a local system with particu-
lar characteristics where the cluster is centred. The focused public goods are local public
goods (Goglio 1999).
Drawing from the reflection on contemporary industrial districts, a general defi-
nition of the progressive features of such inner local structure does include: i) the atti-
tude towards reciprocal trust in economic exchanges, ii) the social prestige attached to
economic entrepreneurship, innovation and participation on the job, iii) the fabric of
complementary competencies. They are factors of local development, or shortly local
factors (Bellandi 1996, Dardi 1997).
Concerning their genesis and reproduction, these factors are the aggregate out-
come of consistent actions by private and public agents, in terms of trust giving and6
keeping, entrepreneurship, learning. Consistency implies constraints to the economic
freedom of agents, and therefore opportunity costs, possibly relevant. The expected re-
turns are twofold. Firstly, such investments give to the single agent the access to a pool
of specific public goods necessary to the realisation of external economies
6. Secondly,
as a joint result, the consistent actions contribute to the aggregate local factor
7.
Similar conditions have been associated by some authors to the concept of social
capital
8. We retain in the text (but not in the title) the ‘local factor’ term, because ‘social
capital’ is often associated both to a too limited notion and a too large one. According to
the first, the principal return of this capital is the support to trust relations limiting the
transaction costs connected to non-aligned individual incentives: but this is just one side
of the problem
9. According to the second, social capital needs not to be local, which of
course is true but out of this paper’s reach.
Concerning the supportive action of local factors on local public goods, it could
be suggested that the first feature of the local factor (i) tends to constrain the strength of
free riding on collective goods; the second feature (ii), while helping a vibrant demog-
raphy of firms, gives a stronger penalisation against passive and traditionalist public
agencies; the third feature (iii) helps the focussing of local public opinion on the collec-
tive needs of the economic core of the community, and limits by this the fragmentation
of local policy
4. Embeddedness and the strength of the local factor
The meaning of embeddedness for a local firm within an industrial district is
easy enough to outline
10. The firm (and firstly its boss) should have a capital of local
relations comprising: a) control of specialised productive knowledge consistent with the
district fabric of competencies; b) a consistent curriculum of pretty fair business behav-
iour with local partners; c) a positive attitude towards comparing and trying, especially
with local partners, new ideas on related business. As argued before, the returns are rep-
resented mainly by the access to focused local public goods, and consequently by the
realisation of external economies of scale and scope.
A non-embedded firm has not an easy access to the same benefits, for a couple
of reasons: firstly, because its internal characteristics make difficult the incorporation of
the benefits (as when the district standards on intermediate goods are differing from the
firm’s internal ones); secondly, because the embedded firms are not ready to exchange7
(for example, if the risk of behavioural mismatch is thought too high). A high enough
loss corresponds to an impossibility to take advantage of the district external economies.
A last preliminary definition concerns the strength of the local factor, which in
the next section will be related to barriers to local external economies. A strong local
factor has at least two properties: effectiveness and sustainability. According to the first,
the local factor supports effectively (i.e. with higher degrees of efficiency and certainty
of results) the production and distribution of local public goods apt to the governance of
external economies of scale and scope for the local system. According to the second, the
characteristics of the local factor give incentive to the investment decisions necessary
for its reproduction, within a set of possible external conditions. In more operative
terms, we can think of internal and external conditions, which make for a more or less
strong local factor. Unluckily we have not yet a general theory on the matter. Here, we
only put forward a few working hypotheses, keeping again the industrial district as a
point of reference.
Effectiveness is increased by a higher degree of cohesion between (and within)
the components of the local factor, and by a certain degree of similarity of social condi-
tions within the community tied to it. For example, regarding the first requisite, attitudes
towards individual entrepreneurship should not be so strong that the space for trust and
for collective entrepreneurship is foreclosed, and vice versa. The multiplicity of com-
petencies should not be so rich as to fragment decisively the demand of local public
goods; nor so weak that cognitive interaction or the emergence of systemic competen-
cies supporting collective entrepreneurship are hindered. The second requisite is con-
nected to the ‘distributive’ characteristics of the local factor. The access to the benefits
of local public goods should be perceived as equally open within the community of in-
vestors, and this demands a limit to economic differences or low barriers to social mo-
bility. But, if the limit to economic differences is kept too low by communitarian values,
then the fear of increasing inequality may block the constitution of new local public
goods when they open opportunities for new lines of business (instead of only support-
ing the working of the old ones).
Sustainability needs effectiveness, because investments without returns are not
confirmed. Of course, the investment decision is influenced also by other factors, as the
time horizon of local agents. For example, a strong preference for quick returns seems
to be an obstacle to a smooth process of reproduction. Vice versa, too much patience
may hinder the capacity to evaluate economic dangers and opportunity costs.8
Lastly, and more on the point of the paper, the deep involvement of non-strictly
local agents (trading entrepreneurs, big firms) in a local factor, which contributes to its
strength during normal periods, has ambiguous effects in periods of high challenge.
They are carriers of systemic competencies for change, and the higher degree of open-
ness makes easier to compare and find external solutions. But the contribution can bring
about a (more or less extensive) substitution of corporate mechanisms (and other non
local resources) for the local factor, as well (Bellandi 1996).
5. On conditions and effects of the local embeddedness of big firms
We get now into the main issue: the embeddedness of a big firm in a local sys-
tem, taking the industrial district as a model of local system. Is it possible, given the
preliminary definitions in previous sections, to think of an “embedded big firm”? The
big firm has a translocal corporate identity, which does not necessarily exclude the co-
existence with different local identities. But, a potential conflict is evident, which we try
to investigate by comparing two ideal types of big firms (Salais and Storper 1992,
Young et al. 1994, Tavares and Pearce 1998).
The first one is the leader of a mass production system, in which the economies
of scale are tied to the preservation of consistent conditions between market uniformity
and technological standardisation. This complex constraint brings about systemic prob-
lems of co-ordination and incentive. The uniformity of market and the standardisation
of technologies reduce the costs of an internal governance solution. The large integrated
firm consequently takes advantage of large internal economies of scale. What would it
be the return of an investment in a local factor by the large integrated firm? Scarce, if
any, when the investment is addressed to gaining a cheap access to the proper benefits
of a strong local factor. The more important reason behind this prevision is perhaps that
such firm cannot accept, for its production system, more than one set of standards, that
is its own set. Furthermore, the very hierarchic nature of the large integrated firm makes
difficult the constitution of contractual relations with local firms on the even plain that
is requested for trust and interacting entrepreneurship.
However, a special if not progressive reason for investing in a local factor can be
defined within this context: which is trying to take away some ‘useful’ resource con-
nected to the local factor, and incorporating them under the command structure of the9
firm. A widespread and successful strategy on these lines may cause the destruction of
the local factor itself. We do not investigate here on the possibility
11.
The second ideal type of big firm is tied to flexible production systems. Here,
economies of scale in specialised activities like R&D, marketing, standardised interme-
diate products, do not transfer directly in economies of mass production of final prod-
ucts, because of strong preferences for differentiation of quality in any single market
reached by the production system. But, within the production system, the same core of
specialised activities may supply a set of different complementary activities, producing
different goods for a pool of markets. In this way, the economies of scale are defined at
the core level, and they transfer potentially to a set of different lines of business, in
terms of reduced unitary cost for the core services and products. Therefore, considering
the aggregate set of lines of business, the production system has potential economies of
scope.
The necessity to adapt the output of the specialised core activity to the needs of
the different complementary activities produces a loss of the economies generated by
the core activity itself. That depends both from technical reasons (duplication of fixed
costs for adapters, etc.) and from organisational ones (the dissimilarities of productive
knowledge characterising the different activities).
The variety of markets imposes relatively heavy costs for a pure hierarchic gov-
ernance solution. An alternative solution, which is possibly consistent with a high de-
gree of realisation of economies of scale in the core activities, is represented by the big
network firm. It has the form of a federation of teams of production, with a strategic
centre which: i) controls directly the core specialised activities; ii) sets general technical
standards; iii) sets rules of exchange between teams, rules of exit, entry and mobility of
employees within and between teams; iv) gives financial coverage against heavy risks,
for example for innovative businesses run by teams. The reduction of the loss of core
economies is achieved through a selection of the lines of business: though different re-
garding their output, they should display nonetheless a certain degree of similarity, both
in terms of input demanded to the core and productive knowledge
12.
Thus, the question is again: What would be the return of an investment in a local
factor by a big network firm? A clue to a positive answer is given by the difficulty of
accommodating an increasing level of variety demanded by markets - when this is the
trend. If it is not possible to escape from such markets, a solution is to make alliances
with other business organisations in order to share fixed costs and productive knowl-10
edge. The alliances focus either on core activities or on complementary activities. Alli-
ance with other big network firms is a possibility. Embeddedment within a strong local
system, for example within a successful industrial district, is another possibility (Vaccà
1996).
This identifies, at last, a proper ratio of local embeddedment for big network
firms. Where they look for district specialised contribution, both in terms of intermedi-
ate products and knowledge input - as, for example, learning in the use of intermediate
products of the firm, or collaboration by teams of workers extolling particular skills and
attitudes, etc.. That is, they look for district external economies. The realisation of such
economies brings about a lower level of internal integration of lines of business, and a
higher capacity to differentiate outputs. But, as discussed above, the idiosyncrasies of
the local factor have to be considered. The big firm can try to overcome the barrier by
investing in a local unit that presents many characteristics of an embedded local firm.
The localised unit should have competencies consistent with the district fabric, and
boast local moral and entrepreneurial attitudes.
A successful mimesis gives access to the local public goods which support the
governance of district external economies. However a fruitful investment also requires
that the localised unit be able to hold the connection with the core strategic activity of
the big network firm. This demands some adaptation of local public goods. For exam-
ple, parts of the local technical standards and quality certification procedures should
host the new brand of competencies of the localised unit, and take a more codified
structure which helps the transfer within the translocal structure of the big firm. Then, a
successful embeddedment implies that the localised unit not only adapts to the district,
but also that it would be able, in time, to modify at least part of the local public goods of
the district. It is an expensive and uncertain process.
Of course, a big firm usually has easy access to large financial assets and to high
strategic competencies, which make easier to take a long run perspective on investment
in local differences and culture. Conversely, financial assets and strategic capacities
may be used for winning short run Stock Exchange games. So, the bent towards invest-
ment in local factors depends on the type of corporate culture internal to the big firm
(Young et al. 1994, Florio 1996). It also depends on the strength of the local factor.
Building on the previous discussion, it seems plausible to consider here a couple of
tentative propositions:11
a) The stronger the local factor, the heavier the investments which a big network firm
should sustain for gaining a fruitful access to its benefits, and the less immediate the
reaping of the same benefits. The idea here is that high internal consistency, simi-
larity, virtuous logic of reproduction (requisites of strength) imply very peculiar and
specific characteristics for the investment in a local factor. Then, it needs a lot of
sunk resources. Furthermore, the pool of focused public goods results from robust
local institutional processes that take time to be influenced, so as to adapt to the big
firm needs. If the proposition holds, embeddedment of big network firms in a dis-
trict with a strong local factor is within the reach of the only ones with a corporate
orientation towards real decentralisation, cultural diversity and patient strategic in-
vestment. They may be pretty rare.
b) The weaker the local factor, the more uncertain the possibility that the district has
the capacity to produce the well-bred local external economies that the would-be
embedded big network firm could be looking for. However, it is also possible to
imagine a strategy of investment in a weak (or weakened) local factor whose pur-
pose is not the access to a proper production of local external economies, but the
gain (or recovery, for example in the case of locally grown big firm) of a dominating
market position on a localised set of specialised suppliers and skilled workers.
The local effects of investment in local factor by a big firm are of two contra-
dictory types. The first one is the positive effect of a successful proper embeddedment:
it enriches the local factor with competencies and codified knowledge not easily pro-
duced by local private and public organisations, and not always introduced by trading
entrepreneurs
13. The second one is the negative effect on the productivity and the repro-
duction of the local factor implied by the asymmetry of economic and market power of
the big firm with respect to individual local firms. We have argued that this asymmetry
matters especially when the local factor is weak or weakened. The gain (or recovery) of
a dominating position by the big firms tends to produce a relatively stable local equilib-
rium with a weak or dispersed local factor.
Conversely, could we say something more on the dynamics of local take off pro-
cesses whose core is a local factor of the district-type, when the starting point is pre-
cisely the presence of a dominating big network firm? Different empirical conditions
have to be considered, as we will see in the next section. But a couple of mildly general
statements may be proposed. Firstly, the nature of the big network firm is not necessar-12
ily in contradiction with the preservation, the diffusion, and even the support of compo-
nents and nuclei of a local factor. Secondly, the occasional weakening of the grip of lo-
cally dominating big network firms may open windows of opportunity for the strength-
ening of a then secondary local factor and the take off of a district-like process of devel-
opment.
6. Big firms and local take-off, some cases
In this section, we propose some empirical applications of the framework drawn
above. We begin precisely with the relations between big firms and local take-off,
making some reference to cases of constitution of contemporary Italian industrial dis-
tricts, when they have resulted from the metamorphosis of an industrial area where units
of one or a few big firms had a central role.
For example, according to an in-depth investigation on the surging period of the
industrial district of Carpi (Solinas, 1994), the location in the area of a couple of big
branch plants by Magneti Marelli (a producer of electric mechanical parts, instruments
and machinery) in the forties has brought there new competencies. They have helped,
during the fifties and the sixties, together with heavy reduction of employment by Mag-
neti Marelli, the development of a mechanical engineering cluster, characterised by
many specialised local firms. Comparing the two plants, the more conducive to spin-
offs has been not the one in which mass production products and Taylorist methods
were prevalent. It has been instead the one in which batch production, rotation of
working experiences, diffusion of manufacturing and trade competencies among work-
ers, and a relatively large autonomy on the job by experienced workers, were demanded.
Besides, mechanical engineering processes were quite easily broken into different spe-
cialised ones, run by (partially) independent specialised firms of small size. Where the
technological de-composition is weaker or impossible, as for example in many chemical
processes, spin-offs are more difficult (Florio 1996).
But the case of Carpi mechanical engineering industry also tell us a story of
weakening dominance of the big firm and growing social support to the industry. It sug-
gests that the diffusion of industrial competencies accumulated within the plants of the
big firm and the possibility to apply them within small firms is not a sufficient condition
for local development. Another in-depth case study gives us a clear representation of
this interplay.13
It is the case of the metamorphosis, during the fifties, of the textile area of Prato
(Tuscany, near Florence) into a big textile industrial district (Dei Ottati 1994). At the
beginning of the fifties, after the post war recovery, the industry and the economy of the
area were dominated by the production of standardised wool fabrics, for national and
international markets, largely realised within the control of a few vertically integrated
companies. They were local firms, representing nonetheless a situation of local domi-
nance by a few centralised organisations. At the margin of this cluster a traditional sec-
ondary system was operating, well embedded into the local society and based on small
producers - mostly artisans with a certain degree of reciprocal specialisation - and small
trading entrepreneurs. The secondary system was supplying small batch wool fabrics for
regional and national markets.
During the fifties, a deep crisis on international markets hit the principal system.
The vertically integrated companies began to dismiss workers and machinery. The con-
temporary rapid growth of demand in Western countries for ever more differentiated
clothing, and the action of trading entrepreneurs, opened a window of opportunity for
the growth of the secondary system. It started to absorb effectively the redundant local
resources and to increase the range of its markets. The growth of the alternative system
was supported not only by the rich reserves of entrepreneurial attitudes incorporated in
it; not only by the experience of transactions based on trust relations; but also by the
strength of local public and collective organisations. They preserved their  ‘own indus-
try’, in particular accommodating the constitution of new local markets for specialised
intermediate wool products - as in the case of the early negotiation and definition of
collective local fees for intermediate textile products and services. At the beginning of
the sixties the alternative system becomes the principal one, and the new industrial dis-
trict is borne.
This story makes clearer in what sense the crisis of the big firm is an opportunity
for the local system. It is a difficult challenge, but a reaction can be supported by the
components of a local factor, if they are already present in the local system, and in par-
ticular if some secondary nuclei of the local economy show a rudimentary but complete
logic of interaction. The components and nuclei of the local factor give at first the fuel
and framework for a reserve solution, but then, with an eventual success, they aggregate
together and grow, becoming the new core of the community.
A third example gives us a richer perspective on the role and timing of the
weakening of the grip of big firms on local industry and society. It is the case of the14
constitution of a jewellery district centred in Arezzo (a city of Tuscany with, as usual,
ancient traditions). The early story of the localised jewellery industry, in the fifties and
sixties, is the story of a company growing quickly and becoming the biggest among the
Italian jewellery companies (one of the biggest in the world, in terms of employees and
output of gold products). In this period the jewellery industry had not a predominant
role within the area centred in the city of Arezzo: a bigger role was kept by the clothing
industry, with a set of by big firms’ plants and a population of local firms mostly but not
always dependent from the first. During the seventies the jewellery industry went on
growing, and in the same period several small firms were set up, often as spin-offs of
the leading company. Arezzo became one of the three industrial poles of the powerful
Italian jewellery industry (the other two are in Veneto and Piedmont).
During the Eighties, the local clothing industry collapsed, while the localised
jewellery industry was becoming more and more robust, both in terms of employees,
multiplicity of specialised firms more or less independent from the strategies of the
leading company, complementary local activities (engineering, chemicals, services,
etc.), export propensities, local institutional and social support. At the beginning of the
nineties it is possible to talk of a surging jewellery industrial district, whose principal
industry has more than 1,200 firms and more than 9,000 employees. The big firm is still
a leading presence, but now its role is more aptly defined in terms of an important con-
tribution to some characteristics of the local factor, than as the engine of the growth of
the local industry. Arezzo district is a "new entry" in the set of the industrial districts
which feature, with their presence, large part of the manufacturing industry of Tuscany
(Bellandi 1998).
Here, the window of opportunity is supplied by a growth of external markets for
local production that exceeds the possibility of profitable local growth of the big firm.
We can imagine that the big firm has, at the beginning of the process, a choice: between
trying to keep at bay the independent local growth or, alternatively, allowing a more or
less free denouement of independent businesses and relations. The second strategy may
be more or less conscious (‘poor dwarfs, they will not go too far’). But a purposeful
choice by a far-sighted network company is not to be excluded, where the limits to in-
ternal growth are partially overcome by richer external relations allowed to grow. Con-
versely, an aggressive attitude to rent exploitation would prevent the understanding of
such opportunities, and by the same token will enforce the preservation of vertical con-
trol with monopolistic (and monopsonistic) abuses.15
The location of large plants of big external firms in economically depressed ar-
eas of South Italy in the last thirty years, for all the public subsidies poured in, have met
heavy problems. Many of these plants are by now dismantled or reduced. Apparently
their ‘weakening’ has not yet produced an outburst of local independent economic ini-
tiative (but for few cases). The deficiency of one or more of the necessary conditions for
co-promoting local factors can be suspected. Within the immense literature on South It-
aly backwardness, some investigations support such view (Florio 1991, Trigilia 1992).
7. Italian industrial districts and location by big external firms
A last point concerns the growing intersection between big firms and mature
Italian industrial districts. The intersection is enlarged both from the inside of industrial
districts (internationalisation), and the outside (investments by external multinational
firms). The literature focussing on the first type of process is already extensive, and it
could be used to substantiate the framework drawn in the previous sections (Brusco and
Paba 1997, Corò and Rullani 1998). Here, we do not stop to discuss such cases. Instead,
we conclude with some evidence on the second type of process.
A recent research
14 has identified the location of manufacturing (possibly to-
gether with non manufacturing) units of the main multinational (Italian and foreigner) in
Italian local systems of small to medium sized enterprises (a proxi of industrial dis-
tricts), here code-named PLS (for ‘productive local system’). At the end of year 1993,
forty nine out of one hundred nine PLSs
15 include local entities (headquarters, subsidi-
aries, branch plants) of forty eight large multinationals groups (of which 13 have a for-
eign parent company). These entities are here coded-named MLE (for ‘multinational lo-
cal entity’). Let us consider some other interesting results:
a) The quota of PLSs including MLEs (on the regional total number of PLSs) is the
highest in Lombardia and Veneto, followed by Emilia Romagna, Toscana, and
Marche. It is worth noting that the five regions host large part of the Italian PLSs.
b) Most part of manufacturing MLEs have a size, in terms of number of employees,
which is similar (less than 99 employees) or not much larger (100-249 employees)
than the size of the majority of units of the local manufacturing firms.
c) Large part of the MLEs are located in PLSs with a primary specialisation in me-
chanical industries, or in those specialised in textile industries. The first type of PLS16
shows the highest percentage of cases of MLEs (on the total of PLSs with similar
primary specialisation), the highest number of different multinational groups hosted,
the highest number and percentage of cases in which the activities of the MLE are
seemingly connected to the primary specialisation of the PLS.
d) Overall the cases of connected MLEs (i.e. whose activity appears to be connected to
the primary specialisation of the hosting PLS) are mildly prevalent. The location
choices of foreign multinationals are pretty similar to those of the Italian multina-
tionals. Finally, there is some evidence that most part of multinational units have
been located in the PLS (as identified in 1991) since the seventies and after, and
only few have been operative there before the sixties.
Such results suggest some remarks in combination with the framework of the
embedded big firm drawn in previous sections. Of course, the fact that a PLS is not nec-
essarily a local system characterised by a strong local factor has to be considered. So, it
is not possible, without in-depth investigations, to say if the presence of MLEs is ex-
plained by the attractive power of a successful local factor, or by the opportunities of
preying chunks of rich industrial areas with weakened local factors.
In any case, the relation between openness to multinational investments and spe-
cialisation in mechanical engineering industries of a PLS is easily justified both by the
relatively high intensity of codified knowledge and by the inner multiplicity of such ac-
tivities. These characteristics tend to reduce the technological barriers to local em-
beddedment for big network firms.
The prevalence of MLEs in the same (or near) sectors, as those which have a
primary role within the single PLSs, is also an index of a strategy of embeddedment.
The same can be told of the mimetic size and of the concentration of such investments
in the Italian regions where industrial districts have the strongest traditions.
8. Policies and the local developmental role of big firms
There are two popular views on policy concerning investments of big firms in
relatively weak regions: a) territorial marketing policies, especially for depressed areas,
by which local investments from external big firms are given various types of incen-
tives; b) state protection against the monopolistic power of multinationals crushing local
communities (Cowling and Sugden 1990). These views receive a particular colour when17
the problem of embeddedness is considered (Young et al. 1994, Florio 1996, Tavares
and Pearce 1998).
Firstly, the problem of promoting local development is not resolved by a simple
location of plants of big firms, and this not only because aggressive and cynic location
strategies by multinationals have to be considered. Even ‘white knights’ fail if they do
not have a right mix of industrial, organisational and cultural qualities. Conversely, even
big firms with good qualities can play as predators.
Secondly, a general countervailing solution, in terms of heavy regulation, has a
defect in this context: the knowledge necessary to understand the differences of behav-
iour, the timing, etc., are not easily controlled from top-down, detached state agencies.
While local authorities easily lack the power necessary to confront aggressive multina-
tionals. Mixed solutions should be defined, for example: i) incentive schemes for tar-
geting developmental subsidiaries, as penalties on short permanence of a MLE in a local
system, or joint investments (both from local organisations and the big firm) on human
capital formation (Zanfei, 2000); ii) ‘guidelines for multinational enterprises’ providing
‘voluntary principles for responsible business conduct’ (OECD, 2000); iii) multilevel
‘monitoring’ of the local effects of transnational private strategies (Bailey, Harte, and
Sugden 1999), possibly with a local - transnational articulation of Competition public
policies; iv) local embeddedment of branches of State agencies (Sweeney 1999).
The explicit combination of such results with some suggestions taken from the
literature on industrial districts helps perhaps to make a point clearer. The developmen-
tal role of big firms is not a question of use and promotion of highly productive local
economic resources within a logic of development which is fundamentally non local. It
is instead a question of combination with a different logic, that is a logic of local devel-
opment. Paths of local development can be based on small and medium sized firms,
when they work in teams and are embedded in a local structure of social relations.
The supply of sets of local public goods has to complement the private offer of
local specialised services to the manufacturing companies. When the inner social struc-
ture helps the supply of local public goods, and it is re-produced by the consistent eco-
nomic behaviour of local (economic and political) agents, the same structure is a local
factor of economic development or, as in the title, a local social capital.
This point does not modify the practical proposals defined by the advancements
recalled just above. But it may help give them a possible systemic perspective, in which18
the core parameter, both for judging transnational strategies and public policies, is pre-
cisely the space for the growth of such capital.
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1 See also Becattini and Rullani 1996, Russo 1996, Amatori 1999.
2 A local system is an area identified by the thickening of daily social and economic relations of
a large set of people among production sites and residential and civic sites. In Italy an empirical approxi-
mation of the local system has been identified by means of statistical elaboration of Census data on daily
commuting: See Sforzi 1996.
3 The structural characteristics of a model of industrial district, the so-called Marshallian industrial
district (Becattini, 1990) may be listed as follows: a) It is a local system. b) There, a principal cluster (or
localised industry) of specialised firms and a local community of families and collective institutions
overlap, in the sense that values, attitudes and investment decisions of the community are affected by the
presence of the industry, and strategic industrial factors are embedded into the socio-economic relation-
ships developing within the community. c) A large division of labour among specialised small units of
production within the principal industry is organised (mainly) locally through specialised companies,
most are most often local and small to medium sized.
4 For example, as Alfred Marshall (1920, p. 225), writing on Nineteenth century industrial dis-
tricts, pointed out.
5 That is quasi public goods, with excludability. They are specific infrastructures, like collective
industrial purifiers, etc.
6 See on a related example Cohen and Levinthal (1989).
7 The local public factors are non tradable goods, that is they are not easily transferable in and
out of a territory, since they are constituted by a network of social and economic relations within a com-
munity of people (you may transfer single relations, not the network).
8 See, for example, Bazan and Schmitz 1997, and Sweeney 1999.
9 A different use of the terminology has been recently proposed by Trigilia (1999). We share
with Trigilia the idea that such progressive features have an evolving and strategic nature, they are not a
fixed attachment of a “lucky” network or region. A similar line of thinking is associated to the concept of
‘innovative milieu’ (Maillat 1996).
10 We suppose here that local firms cannot be embedded in a local system different from that in
which they are located. But, of course, not necessarily a local firm is an embedded one.
11 See for example Florio (1996) on the possibility of drain of local entrepreneurial resources by
a large local unit of an external big firm.
12,). Here we will maintain that also the big network firm has usually a strong strategic and
knowledge core (Varaldo 1997). But on ‘heterarchies’ see Vaccà (1996) and Tavares and Pearc (1998).
13 For example, knowledge on specific application of new technologies, or skills for the man-
agement of complex marketing or infrastructural problems.
14 Tessieri  (2000),  from which are extracted the data reported in the following paragraphs of the
text. The data refer to the situation in 1993, as collected from the R&S directories (Mediobanca, Milan)
on the 180 main economic firms (generally they have the form of groups of firms) operating in Italy. See
also Coltorti (1990).
15 The PLSs are identified on the basis of 1991 Census data: Istat 1997.19
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